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Opportunity Costs of Globalizing 
Information Licenses: Embedding 
Consumer Rights within the Legislative 
Framework for Information Contracts 
Gail E. Evans* 
INTRODUCTION 
The economy of the latter twentieth century has witnessed a 
radical shift in production and value.  We have emerged from an 
age in which the primary mode of production was one of mass 
manufacture to an age that generates and relies upon the organiz-
ing, processing and accumulation of information.1  An information 
industry2 has emerged spearheaded by software and publishing 
corporations, which are growing at a more rapid rate than the 
manufacturing sector of the economy.3  The value of their assets 
 
 *Professor of Law, Southern Cross University Law School, Australia.  The author 
wishes to thank Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Professor Brian Fitzgerald, Profes-
sor Hugh Hansen, Professor Wendy J. Gordon, Professor J.H. Reichman and Martin 
Mitchell, Director, Linux & Network Solutions, for their advice and support.  This paper 
was presented on April 8-9, 1999, at the Seventh Annual Conference on International In-
tellectual Property Law and Policy held at the Fordham University School of Law, New 
York City. 
1. Frank Webster explains how the nationalistic mass production model of the Ford 
Motor Corporation has given way to globalization and the transnational corporation 
through which information has been pivotal in the development of the post Fordist infor-
mation society.  FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 136-40 
(1994). 
2. While industries such as Microsoft and IBM are often loosely characterized as 
copyright based, this qualification can be misleading in so far as much of the information 
proprietors seek to protect is not sufficiently innovative to qualify for copyright protec-
tion.  See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991). 
3. In the United States, software and related information technologies account for 
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lies in  intangibles, in information.  Computer networks have made 
possible the commodification and exchange of information.  The 
Internet facilitates not only the indirect exchange of products in the 
electronic ordering of information products in tangible form on 
floppy or compact disk, but also the direct exchange of information 
products in intangible form, by means of online delivery.4  Con-
sumers simply download the product to their computer.  The Inter-
net has given rise to a global marketplace in which it is possible to 
buy and sell information at low cost across national frontiers. 
Law arises out of the needs of the commodity form of produc-
tion.5 The information industry has fashioned a licensing contract 
to meet its needs in the mass market.  Consumer transactions are 
accompanied by a shrink-wrap or clickwrap licensing agreement,6 
which purports to restrict the ability of consumers to modify or re-
 
8.2 per cent of GDP. This sector has contributed one-third of all real growth in the United 
States in the past three years, and is growing at twice the rate of the economy as a whole. 
See Ministerial Council for the Information Economy, Towards an Australian Strategy 
for the Information Economy, § 1.2 (July 1998) <http://www.noie.gov.au/strategy.html>.  
Internet commerce is set to grow at a rapid pace during the next four years, with the value 
of goods and services traded between companies, business to business, rising from US$8 
billion this year to US$327 billion in 2002.  See U.S. On-line Business Trade will Soar to 
$1.3 Trillion by 2003, According to Forrester Research, December 17, 1998, available at 
<http://www.forrester.com/ER/Press/Release/0,1769,121FF.html>. 
4. This would be the case where a product, such as an anti-virus software program, 
is both delivered and consumed in real time. 
5. On the notion of commodity and subject see EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND 
MARXISM, A GENERAL THEORY 109-20 (Barbara Einhorn trans. & Chris Arthur ed., 
1989). 
6. Most software is sold with a shrink-wrap agreement enclosed.  The software ven-
dor offers to sell or license the use of her software according to terms accompanying the 
software.  The purchaser or licensee agrees by his conduct to be bound by such terms.  
Such conduct typically takes the form of the retention or use of the software after being 
provided an opportunity to review the contract’s terms and return the software for a full 
refund if the terms are unacceptable.  Click-wrap agreements are contracts formed en-
tirely over the Internet.  A party posts terms on its Web site pursuant to which it offers to 
sell goods or services.  To buy these goods, the purchaser is required to indicate his as-
sent to be bound by the terms of the offer by his conduct - typically the act of clicking on 
a button stating “I agree.”  Once the purchaser indicates his assent to be bound, the con-
tract is formed on the posted terms, and the sale is consummated.  No paper record is cre-
ated nor is the signature of the purchaser required.  See Joann Nesta Grossman, Causes of 
Action On and Off the Contract in Year 2000 Litigation, 18 REV. LITIG. 553, 557 (1999); 
see also John F. Delaney and Robert Murphy, The Law of the Internet: A Summary of 
U.S. Internet Caselaw and Legal Developments, 570 PLI/Pat 169, 347 (1999). 
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sell the information product.  Licensing is the one existing concept 
that addresses the nature of information as a commodity.  Informa-
tion is an unusual commodity because it can be consumed by one 
person and yet still be available to others.  Once commodified in-
formation is a paradox in as much as it is both a finite yet infinitely 
re-useable resource.  Information cannot be definitively transferred 
or conveyed to the buyer.7  For example, Westlaw does not tender 
its entire database to its subscribers.  It offers searches of informa-
tion that differ each time the subscriber “signs-on.”  Consequently, 
for the information merchant, licensing provides a means of retain-
ing an ongoing interest in the property.  In the grant of access to an 
electronic database the user does not receive a transfer of owner-
ship rights in the “copy,” but simply a limited transfer of rights to 
use information on stated terms and conditions.8 
Information has become one more commodity of exchange.  
The advent of information licensing signals a dramatic transforma-
tion in the ordering of information in our society.  Since the age of 
the printing press, the law of copyright, a system of granting statu-
tory monopolies for sufficiently innovative works, has been the 
primary form of legal protection accorded information.  However, 
the ascendancy of contract over copyright is a reflection of infor-
mation as the most valuable economic unit.  In the information 
age, there is every indication that the legal ordering concept of 
contract is being used to sustain a society based on the commodifi-
cation of information. 
As a matter of legal principle, the information license is a de-
vice which sits uncomfortably within the paradigms of either copy-
right or sales law.  The codification of information licenses in pro-
posed Article 2B of the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC)9 only serves to accentuate the tendency for contract to as-
 
7. See Simpson v. Connolly, 2 All E.R. 474, 476 (Q.B. 1953); see also City Motors 
(1933) Proprietary, Ltd. v. Southern Aerial Super Service Proprietary, Ltd., 106 C.L.R. 
477, 486 (1961). 
8. See Ticketron Ltd. Partnership v. Flip Side, Inc, No. 92-C-0911, 1993 WL 
214164 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1993); Soderholm v. Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club Inc., 587 
N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
9. Draft Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code was slated for approval in 
July 1999, and enactment by the states in 2000.  However, agreement on a final text 
proved so controversial that on April 7, 1999 the National Conference of Commissioners 
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sume the leading role in the management of information for elec-
tronic transactions.10  It analogizes the transfer of information 
within society to a sale of goods transaction.  It purports to render 
information subject to warranties as to title, fitness of purpose and 
merchantability. 
The information industry was born global and the provisions of 
Article 2B, as exemplified by those pertaining to choice of law, re-
veal its global aspirations.  While international lawmakers have yet 
to address the substantive aspects of buying and selling informa-
tion products,11 they would do well to heed the debate currently 
occurring in the United States concerning the potential scope of the 
industry’s “information monopoly” under such legislation and the 
consequent restrictions on user and public domain rights.  Consid-
ering that the information industry is one of the fastest growing 
sectors of the American economy,12 the capacity of the information 
industry to generate export income provides the same rationale that 
saw minimum standards of intellectual property protection imple-
mented worldwide by the World Trade Organization under the 
 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) announced 
that legal rules for computer information transactions would not be promulgated as part 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Instead NCCUSL, alone and therefore without need 
of the ALI vote, intends to promulgate the rules for adoption by states as the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).  See ALI and NCCUSL Announce 
That Legal Rules For Computer Information Will Not Be Part of the UCC, U.C.C. BULL. 
4-5, July 1999; Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, draft of July 23-30, 
1999, (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citam99.htm>. 
Note: all references to U.C.C. Article 2B correspond to the proposed draft of the 
NCCUSL and the ALI, February 1, 1999, available as at the time of writing and the au-
thor’s comments are limited  hereto: <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/2b 
299.htm>. 
10. See David E. Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 
CAL. LAW REV. 17, 21-25 (1999). 
11. To date, most countries, including Australia, have been largely concerned with 
facilitating electronic commerce by ensuring the recognition of digital signatures and the 
security of electronic cash transactions.  See UNITED NATIONS: UNCITRAL Model Law 
On Electronic Commerce, 36 I.L.M. 197 (1997).  For example, the Australian Govern-
ment Report, “Electronic Commerce: Building the Legal Framework”, March 31, 1998, 
proposes legislating to ensure the legal recognition of electronic signatures and docu-
ments. See <http://www.law.gov.au>. 
12. See David Skidmore, Computer World Seen Helping Economy, U.S. Industry & 
Trade Outlook ‘99 (January 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usito99/099-
ap.htm> (reporting that the computer and technology industry continues to demonstrate 
stellar growth and such growth is forecasted into the next century). 
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TRIPS Agreement.13  If the United States in combination with the 
information industry succeeds in legislating information licensing 
in the WTO, states would be constrained by their membership ob-
ligations from amending their national laws to take account of pub-
lic policy goals in the dissemination of information.14 
Article 2B-style licenses would give public endorsement to the 
private sector initiative in click-on licenses, accentuating the trend 
by the industry to claim uniform ownership rights in undifferenti-
ated information.  If we proceed to endorse such a model at the 
global level, we are also endorsing the balance of rights over in-
formation which gives a disproportionate power and weight to the 
proprietary interests of licensors.  Clearly, before such a step is 
taken, we need to understand the nature of the Internet as a com-
mercial environment and make an assessment of its likely impact 
on the balance of current rights in information between public and 
private domains.  What we see in Article 2B is no less than the un-
folding of a new information constitution.  For in its broader di-
mensions this debate is about the distribution of power in informa-
tion society.  In this case, given the nature and importance of the 
digital medium, there should be a global consensus on the distribu-
tion of power between information rightholders and users. 
I refer to the need for a global consensus since the advent of 
globalization has dramatically diminished the ability of the nation 
state to control the deployment of its resources.15 Transnational 
 
13. See Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD 
COMPETITION, LAW AND ECON. REV. Sept. 1994, at 137; Gail E. Evans, The Principle of 
National Treatment and the International Protection of Industrial Property, 18 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 149 (1996); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalisms: The 
Framework for Universalizing Substantive International Law? 5 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI 
YEARBOOK OF INT’L. L. 111 (1996-97). 
14. Concerning issues of substantive and procedural justice in the global regulation 
of intellectual property, see Gail E. Evans, Issues of Legitimacy and the Resolution of In-
tellectual Property Disputes in the Supercourt of the World Trade Organization, 3 J. OF 
INT’L. TRADE L. AND REG. 81-98 (1998). 
15. The term globalization is primarily used to describe key aspects of economic 
transformation in the latter twentieth century.  See THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, 10 (1995).  Concerning the meaning and 
concept of globalization see also H. Steiger, Plaidoyer pour une Jurisdiction Internation-
ale Obligatoire in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 824-26 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed. 1998); see also H.G. Krenzler, Globalization and 
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corporations (TNCs) on the other hand are mobile and can self-
regulate as well as choose between state regulators.  The post war 
economic boom, coupled with the revolution in communications 
technology, has seen corporations and financial institutions unite to 
form global entities whose power and wealth rivals the nation 
state.16  The powerlessness of the state to legislate effectively can 
only be overcome by developing such cross-border structures as 
we see in the European Union or the World Trade Organization.17 
Recognizing that contract has displaced copyright as the pri-
mary regime for the governance of information and that this shift 
presupposes a change in the distribution of informational rights be-
tween the private and public domains; recognizing also that states, 
on behalf of their citizens, can only address this situation effec-
tively by exercising their sovereignty collectively at the transna-
tional level - in this paper, I argue that prior to endorsing the mass 
market licensing of information, states should seek to address the 
inequality in bargaining power between producer and user by em-
bedding consumer rights within the legislative framework for in-
formation contracts.18  Accordingly, Part I describes the private 
sector response to the commodification of information via digital 
networks in the form of standard form, click-on licensing agree-
 
Multilateral Rules 4 (4) J. OF INT’L. TRADE L & REG. 144, 145 (1998) (highlighting the 
qualitative difference between nineteenth and twentieth century trends to economic inte-
gration in three major aspects: the prodigious growth in foreign direct investment; the 
contribution of the services sector to gross national product and the globalization of the 
financial economy).  By comparison, social and political scientists prefer a more compre-
hensive explanation.  David Held and Andrew McGrew, Globalization and the Liberal 
Democratic State, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM 58-
59 (Yoshikazu Sakamoto ed. 1994)(“[G]lobalization defines a universal process or set of 
processes that generate a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the 
states and societies that make up the modern world system. . . .”). 
16. During the first half of the century, major extractive, service and manufacturing 
firms in Europe and North America had already developed a substantial international 
presence. See THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 154, at 18 (“After 
1945, the weight of these transnational corporations . . . in the world economy grew as 
the pioneers matured and were joined by Japanese and subsequently by other Asian and 
Latin American enterprises.”). 
17. STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-4 
(1995). 
18. Although the draft computer information licensing statute has now been re-
moved from the Uniform Commercial Code, this argument remains valid.  See supra note 
9. 
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ments.  It explains how this lex mercatoria might be codified as 
Article 2B of the United States Uniform Commercial Code and 
how, given its extraterritorial aspirations, this development would 
set a precedent for the global promulgation of legal protection for 
information licensing.  In public legal institutions and information 
products, Part II considers the need for global policy-making to-
wards a regulatory response to the private licensing of information 
that strikes a balance between private and public domain rights in 
information.  It explains the conceptual challenges that must be 
addressed within the paradigm of sales law, if online information 
transactions are to be accommodated within such a regulatory 
framework.  Part III examines the emergence of a new information 
order for the digital millennium which sees contract displacing 
copyright as the primary means of governing the exchange and dis-
semination of information in our society.  It explains the ascen-
dancy of contract in light of the commodity-exchange theory of 
Evgeny B. Pashukanis.19  In drawing our attention to the darker 
side of contractual self-rule in the new cyber-market, Part IV ar-
gues that instead of adopting a “wait-and-see” attitude to the im-
pact of restrictive licensing practices, lawmakers should attempt to 
accommodate the rights embodied in consumer protection law with 
innovative measures designed to meet the distinctive needs of the 
online marketplace.  Given the displacement of copyright protec-
tion, such an accommodation, it is argued, also requires a recon-
ciliation between the fair use provisions of the copyright law and 
concepts of public policy and consumer rights within the legisla-
tive framework of contract law.  In recommending that, as a matter 
of priority, law and policy makers debate information licensing and 
consumer protection at the transnational level of governance, Part 
V contains some proposals as to how that debate might begin.  By 
way of conclusion, this Article urges both industry and user groups 
to realize that the legal provision for a marketplace in which con-
sumers feel secure in their transactions is a goal which is ulti-
mately in the interests of all stakeholders in information society. 
 
19. Pashukanis, supra note 5. 
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I. GLOBAL INFORMATIONALISM: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE 
CREATION OF EXTERNAL LEGAL ORDERS 
Global informationalism sustains the realization of wealth 
through the commodification and exchange of information.  Com-
puter technology makes it possible to convert to digital form all 
manner of information, including text, audiovisual works and 
computer software.  It is transferred to a binary computer format 
enabling a computer to process the work in the same way as simple 
data, in digital quality.  Once digitized, the information may be 
simply stored on hard disk ready for instant uploading and retrieval 
by a mass market of worldwide consumers.  The new digital distri-
bution system fundamentally changes the one-way character of 
traditional methods of distribution from producer to user.  Users 
access the internet sites provided by the producer and either 
download their chosen software or access and extract information 
from the required database.  Their value does not lie in a tangible 
deliverable, but in information and the right to control and exploit 
it.  The transaction that drives the information economy is the li-
censing of information products. 
A.  Click-On Information Contracts 
The ubiquitous click-on license satisfies the needs of the indus-
try.  It has become mercantile custom for the software and com-
puter information industries to use a standard form contract in the 
form of a shrink-wrap or clickwrap licensing agreement for mass 
market transactions.  This document construes consumers breaking 
open the plastic shrinkwrap or installing the software on their 
computers as assent to the terms of the license.  In placing a 
shrinkwrap license provision on its software product, the producer 
seeks not only to prohibit infringement of any intellectual property 
rights in the information, but also to limit liability and disclaim 
warranties.  The shrinkwrap license commonly disclaims all war-
ranties, denies users the authority to make backup copies, modify, 
or resell the software, to decompile the code and, in the event of a 
dispute, invokes the law of the licensor’s chosen jurisdiction. 
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B.  Legislative Endorsement of Information Contracts under 
UCC Article 2B 
Given the strength of the information industry in the United 
States and its importance to the nation’s future prosperity, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws20 and 
the American Law Institute21 proposed reforming the UCC22 with 
the addition of a new Article 2B23 which would validate informa-
tion licenses and create new rules concerning electronic contract-
ing for information products.24  Proposed Article 2B is designed to 
deal with transactions in computer information and applies broadly 
to on-line and Internet transactions in software and databases.  In 
so far as the formal aspects of contract are concerned, Article 2B 
follows the UNCITRAL Model Law.  Article 2B gives full recog-
nition to contracts formed electronically25 to the extent that it vali-
dates contracts made by electronic agents or pre-programmed 
computer programs.26 
In so far as the substantive aspects of information transactions 
 
20. The National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
is comprised of commissioners appointed from every state with the aim of drafting uni-
form legislation for adoption by all states.  See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY 
OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON THE UNIFORM STATE LAW 3-4 (1991). 
21. The American Law Institute (ALI) is a national organization, formed in 1923, 
comprised of elected legal professionals, whose aim is to “promote the clarification and 
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better ad-
ministration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal 
work.”  THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE SEVENTY-FIFTH 
ANNIVERSARY 1923-1998 7, 210 (1998); see also About the American Law Institute (vis-
ited Sept. 7, 1999) <http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm>. 
22. First promulgated by the ALI and the NCCUSL in 1952, and subsequently re-
vised, the code has been adopted in some variation by every state. 
23. See supra note 9. 
24. For an account of the project history and the drafting process, see Draft Article 
2B-Licenses, July 1998 (visited Sept. 9, 1999) 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/2b398.htm> ; Mary Jo Howard Dively and 
Donald A. Cohn, Treatment of Consumers Under Proposed U.C.C Article 2B Licenses 16 
J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. LAW 315, 318-20 (1997). 
25. On the manifestation of assent and the legal recognition of electronic records 
and authentications, see U.C.C. §§ 2B-111, 2B-113. 
26. Article 2B introduces the concept of an “electronic agent,” which is a computer 
program or other electronic or automated means to act on behalf of a party.  See U.C.C. § 
2B-102(22). 
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are concerned, Article 2B is based on the paradigm for a contract 
of sale.  Its provisions analogize the exchange of information to the 
well-known elements of a sale of goods.  Article 2B deals with 
warranties for information products; the transfer of interests and 
rights; the obligations of buyer and seller in performing the con-
tract; and remedies available to the parties in the event of a breach 
of the information contract.  For example, while Article 2B con-
tains provisions relating to implied warranties of title, description, 
fitness and merchantability, these have been modified to meet the 
unique character of information products.27  Thus, merchantability 
for Article 2B mass marketed licenses consists of five minimum 
performance standards including the contract, fitness for the ordi-
nary purposes and the functionality of a computer program.28 
C.  The Sum and Substance of Article 2B: Standard Form 
Consumer Information 
As the commodification of information advances, mass- market 
transactions will constitute the contractual relationships at the cen-
ter of the information economy.  While Article 2B also provides 
for negotiated contracts for customized information products, the 
contractual relationships contemplated by Article 2B are princi-
pally mass market standard form contracts for the sale of informa-
tion products.  Section 102 defines “mass-market license” to mean 
“a standard form that is prepared for and used in a mass-market 
 
27. See UCC § 2B-401(warranty and obligations concerning quiet enjoyment and 
non-infringement); UCC § 2B-402 (express warranties); UCC § 2B-403 (implied war-
ranty of merchantability); UCC § 2B-404 (implied warranty of informational content); 
UCC § 2B-405 (implied warranty of purpose). 
28. See UCC § 2B-403 (generally applying UCC Article 2 warranty of merchant-
ability to computer programs, as follows: (a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modi-
fied, a merchant licensor of a computer program warrants: (1) to the end user that the 
computer program is reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is distributed; 
(2) to a distributor that: (A) the program is adequately packaged and labeled as the 
agreement or the circumstances may require; and (B) in the case of multiple copies, the 
copies are within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality, and 
quantity, within each unit and among all units involved; and (3) that the program con-
forms to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label, if any. (b) 
Unless disclaimed or modified, other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing 
or usage of trade. (c) A warranty created under this section does not apply to informa-
tional content, including its aesthetics, market appeal, accuracy, or subjective quality, 
whether or not included in or created by a computer program). 
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transaction;” which is “a consumer transaction, or any other trans-
action in information or informational rights directed to the general 
public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the same 
information with an end-user licensee.”29  In effect, Article 2B 
codifies the custom of the information industry in online merchan-
dising of information by means of click-on license.30  Section 2B-
211 sets out a series of rules which would render mass market li-
censes enforceable, even though they are not signed by both parties 
and even if the license terms are not available prior to the pur-
chase.31  Section 211 endorses the use of click-on licenses by in-
troducing the concept of “manifest assent.”  Under Article 2B, 
mass-market licenses are enforceable if the consumer “manifests 
assent” to the license before or during the initial use of or access to 
the software.  Consumers are deemed to have manifested their as-
sent by “signing” the record or by some other affirmative conduct 
 
29. A “mass-market transaction” is defined in UCC § 2B-102 (34) as “a transaction 
under this article that is: (A) a consumer transaction; or (B) any other transaction with an 
end-user licensee if (i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed 
to the general public as a whole including consumers under substantially the same terms 
for the same information; (ii) the licensee acquires the information or rights in a retail 
transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a re-
tail market; and (iii) the transaction is not a (I) a contract for redistribution; or for public 
performance or public display of a copyrighted work; (II) a transaction in which the in-
formation is customized or otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee 
other than minor customization using a capability of the information intended for that 
purpose; (III) a site license; or (IV) an access contract.” UCC § 2B-102 (34).  The term 
therefore “includes all consumer transactions and some transactions between business in 
a retail market.  It does not include ordinary commercial transactions between businesses 
using ordinary commercial methods of acquiring or transferring commercial informa-
tion.”  U.C.C. § 2B-102, Reporter’s Notes, 28. 
30. Note the intended legislative endorsement of the click-on license under UCC § 
2B-207 which provides: “(a) The terms of a record may be adopted as the terms of the 
contract after beginning performance or use under the agreement if the parties had reason 
to know that their agreement would be represented in whole or in part by a later record to 
be agreed and there was no opportunity to review the record or a copy of it before per-
formance or use commenced. (b) If a party adopts the terms of a record, the terms be-
come part of the contract without regard to the party’s knowledge or understanding of 
individual terms in the record, except for a term that is unenforceable because it fails to 
satisfy another requirement of this article.” UCC § 2B-207(a),(b). Under UCC § 2B-
208(mass market licenses): “A party adopts the terms of a mass-market license for pur-
poses of Section 2B-207 only if the party agrees to the license, by manifesting assent or 
otherwise, before or during the party’s initial performance or use of or access to the in-
formation.”  U.C.C. §§ 2B-208(a). 
31. Cf. UCITA § 211. 
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that, under the license, constitutes acceptance, as long as they were 
afforded an opportunity to decline such action after reviewing the 
license.32  If the terms of the license are available for review only 
after the licensee has paid a fee, the license is not binding, and a 
refund is available, provided that the licensee stops using the soft-
ware and returns all copies.33  If a specific term is one that the li-
censor should know would cause an ordinary and reasonable licen-
see to refuse the license, then that term does not become part of the 
license unless the licensee “manifests assent” to that specific 
term.34 
D.  Contracts Choice of Law According to UCC 2B: 
Legislating Information Licenses Extraterritorially 
Given the strength of the information industry in the US, and 
the size of its market, the default rules in proposed Article 2B-107 
would have a worldwide impact on the law governing information 
contracts.  As a general rule, and in accord with cases dealing with 
the issue in information-related contracts, Article 2B enforces 
choice of law agreements.35  In the absence of an agreement on the 
governing law it adopts the “most significant relationship” test.  
However, in the case of electronic transactions or online transfers 
of information, Article 2B provides an important and novel qualifi-
 
32. According to UCITA sections 207 and 208, to be binding, the party must be af-
forded an opportunity both to review the contract’s terms, and to decline or accept the 
offer.  UCITA § § 207, 208.  Opportunity to review is defined in UCC 2B-112. Accord-
ing to UCC 2B-111 “A person or electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term in 
a record if the person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review 
the record, term or a copy of it, or if the electronic agent, after having had an opportunity 
to review: (1) authenticates the record or term.”  UCC § 2B-111. 
33. See UCC § 2B-112; UCC § 2B-208(b). 
34. However, in a traditional shrinkwrap license, there is no practical way to assent 
to a specific term, since the licensee tears open the shrinkwrap only once. 
35. This rule follows cases dealing with the issue in information-related contracts.  
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Janss, 729 F.2d 1395, 1398-1401 (11th Cir. 1984); Universal Gym 
Equip., Inc. v. Atlantic Health & Fitness Products, 229 U.S.P.Q. 335 (D. Md. 1985); 
Northeast Data Sys., Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Computer Sys. Co., 986 F.2d 607, 610 
(1st Cir. 1993).  See also THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 
(1988)(proposing a similar rule, the Most Significant Relationship, for contract issues 
that can be resolved by agreement).  In the absence of an agreement on the governing law 
and except for the rules in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), subsection (b) adopts a “most 
significant relationship” test. Id. 
EVANSAUREV2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:26 PM 
1999] OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF GLOBAL LICENSES 279 
cation to this rule.  Subsection (b)(1) selects applicable law based 
on the location of the licensor.  While the electronic medium dic-
tates such qualification, it has the result of enhancing the power of 
the licensor, as the on-line vendor makes direct access available to 
the entire world via the Internet by the very nature of the distribu-
tion system. 36  Moreover, Article 2B does not permit a court to in-
validate a contract term on the ground that the chosen law is not 
reasonably related to the transaction.  This limitation is justified on 
the basis that in a global information economy, limitations of that 
type are inappropriate and arbitrary.  However, the question re-
mains: inappropriate and arbitrary for whom? Given the reality of 
standard form contracts, this approach once more favors the licen-
sor’s freedom to select substantive rules governing liability.  Fi-
nally, we are given some idea of the potential application and in-
fluence of information licensing under Article 2B.  If the 
agreement does not choose an applicable law, 2B-107 (c) provides 
as follows: 
. . . if the jurisdiction whose law governs under that subsec-
tion is outside the United States, the law of that jurisdiction 
governs only if it provides substantially similar protections 
and rights to a party not located in that jurisdiction as are 
provided under this article.  Otherwise, the law of the juris-
diction in the United States which has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction governs. 
Although the authors of 2B comment that differences between 
American and foreign law must be substantial and adverse to the 
party not located in that jurisdiction; in the enactment of such a 
provision, there is clearly room for abuse in the form of legal im-
perialism.  As Professor Pamela Samuelson has wryly noted, if Ar-
ticle 2B achieves its global aspirations, the law of Washington 
State would govern all contracts.37 
 
36. The licensor’s location is described in subsection (d) and does not depend on the 
location of the computer that contains the information.  Any other rule, the Reporter 
stresses, would require that the information provider comply with the law of all states and 
all countries since under the technology it will not necessarily be clear or even knowable 
where the information is being sent.  See UCC § 2B-107, Reporter’s Note 4. 
37. IMPRIMATUR Consensus Forum 1998, Contracts and Copyright: The Legal 
Framework for Future Electronic Copyright Management, London July 2-3, 1998, 52 
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Similarly, clauses concerning choice of forum are especially 
important in information contracts.  The numerous decisions con-
cerning personal jurisdiction reveal an uncertainty about when do-
ing business on the Internet exposes a party to jurisdiction in all 
states and all countries.  Choice of forum terms allow parties to 
control this issue and the risk or costs it creates.  Proposed Article 
2B-208 would enforce a choice of forum clause unless it is “unrea-
sonable and unjust.”38  A court may invalidate the clause if it has 
no valid commercial purpose and has severe and unfair affects on 
the other party.  On the one hand this provision would prevent the 
licensor from enforcing a forum clause chosen solely to prevent the 
licensee from contesting disputes.  On the other hand a contractual 
choice of forum which reflects valid commercial purposes, is not 
invalid simply because it has an adverse effect on a party, even if 
that party had less bargaining power than the other party. 
In sum, the statutory licensing of information sees the terms 
and conditions agreed upon by the information industry given legal 
effect through an interaction of private contract-making with the 
legal order of the state.  While this development may follow a fa-
miliar trend, given the nature of the subject matter, the global im-
pact of information licensing and the extraterritorial aspirations of 
Article 2B, it is certainly not a cause for complacency among law 
and policy makers.  Considering the singular nature of information 
as a resource, the influence of TNCs as lobbyists in the generation 
of multilateral regulatory regimes and the inequality of power be-
tween supplier and private individual consumer, the question re-
mains whether the practice of TNCs generates conflicts of interest 
which demand a regulatory response. 
In the generation of the information license we see the effect of 
the business practices of TNCs on the development of substantive 
rules of commercial law.  The ability of the transnational informa-
 
para12.3.11:<http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/IMP_FTP/contract.pdf >. 
38. See UCC § 2B-208; Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Pelle-
port Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984); see 
also Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke Nederlan N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 
1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 80, cmt. c (1988). In Internet 
transactions, a contractual choice of forum is ordinarily enforceable.  The Court’s discus-
sion in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991) is relevant to deter-
mine reasonableness in Internet contracting. 
EVANSAUREV2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:26 PM 
1999] OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF GLOBAL LICENSES 281 
tion industry to influence the nature and content of commercial le-
gal obligations is an aspect of market power.39  This proposition 
reaches its fullest expression in an information market dominated 
by standardized contracts.  The information license is no more than 
the form of contract used by market leaders which has become the 
industry standard over time. 
Historically of course, the influence of market leaders on the 
development of commercial law is not new.  Consider, for exam-
ple, in the field of marine insurance, that the dominance of the 
London market resulted in the standardization of the marine insur-
ance policy around the Lloyds Ship and Goods Form.  The law re-
lating to marine insurance emerged in the late eighteenth century 
when the English courts, under the guidance of Lord Mansfield, 
upheld the accepted commercial meaning of the SG (Ship and 
Goods) Form and its specific clauses.40  This process culminated in 
the codification of the common law relating to marine insurance in 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906.41  Likewise, in respect of informa-
tion products, the acceptance by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in ProCD v. Zeidenberg42 of informa-
tion licenses and their proposed codification under Article 2B of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, signifies that the global informa-
tion market will be dominated by such contracts. 
II.  PUBLIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION PRODUCTS 
A.  Concerning the Need for a Global Regulatory Response to 
the Private Licensing of Information 
We need an information constitution that strikes a balance be-
tween private and public domain rights in information.  However, a 
just apportioning of rights in information society is a task which 
can only be effectively undertaken at the global level.  The politi-
 
39. On how TNCs influence the evolution of legal orders that seek to govern their 
activities, see Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘Global Bukowina’ Examined: Viewing the Multina-
tional Enterprise as a Transnational Law-making Community in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT 
A STATE, 79, 85-86  (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
40. Id. at 86-87. 
41. 6 Edw. VII, ch 41 § 55(2). 
42. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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cal reality of a global information economy means that information 
transactions are subject to global competition.  In this threatening 
new world, information producers will be susceptible to the sug-
gestion that rival traders are deriving their competitive edge from 
domestic institutions or policies that are yielding an unfair advan-
tage.  The fact that some states do not have the same regulations, 
that they do not have to meet the same consumer standards, for ex-
ample, will become a common complaint in the countries that have 
higher standards.  By the same token, it will be necessary to see 
that these countries, generally OECD countries, do not capture the 
institutions of free trade in order to protect their national interest 
by unfair means.  The move to export Article 2B might be seen as 
intrinsically anti-competitive.  It might be seen as an attempt by the 
largest of the licensor states to use the regulation of information 
transactions as a covert form of protectionism.43  Taking account 
of the kaleidoscopic nature of comparative advantage,44 to permit 
differences in national regimes would be to risk setting in train a 
deregulatory race to the bottom as each state seeks to minimize the 
legal obligations imposed upon business in order to attract invest-
ment and trade in information products.45 
B.  The Problem of Accommodating Information Transactions 
within the Sale of Goods Regime 
Sales law is a manifestation of a manufacturing age in which 
goods were tangible and occupied a finite space.  Case law shows 
that contracts for the transfer of intangible property test the limits 
of sales law.  As a threshold matter, its application is questionable 
because (a) the online information products are not “goods” under 
 
43. It is arguable that the frequent use of conventional fair trade mechanisms in the 
1980s, such as the levying of antidumping and countervailing duties (designed to offset 
foreign subsidies), is to be explained not in terms of a genuine rise in the phenomena of 
predatory dumping and foreign subsidization, but as the capture of these mechanisms for 
protectionist purposes.  See J.N. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade 25 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 233-34 (1993). 
44. Id. at 234. 
45. On the relationship between international trade and national information policy 
see Gail E. Evans and Brian F. Fitzgerald, Information Transactions Under UCC Article 
2B: The Ascendancy of Freedom of Contract in the Digital MillenniumI, 21 U. OF NEW S. 
WALES L. J. 404 (1998). 
EVANSAUREV2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:26 PM 
1999] OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF GLOBAL LICENSES 283 
Sale of Goods legislation and; (b) the transaction itself is not a 
“sale,” but rather a license to use or access the work.  Conse-
quently, the current legal status of pure intangibles is confusing 
and ambiguous. 
1.  The Vienna Sales Convention 
The substantive provisions of sales law are a matter for The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods 1980 (CISG).46  However, as the CISG contains no defi-
nition of “goods,” we therefore fall back to domestic law.  Gener-
ally speaking, the courts tend to apply sales law based on the ra-
tionale that the packaged product in software and other intangibles 
should be treated no differently than any other labor-intensive 
good.47  As defined in section 5(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 
(NSW),48 “goods” includes all chattels personal or moveable prop-
erty other than choses in action such as copyright.  Generally, the 
courts interpret what constitutes “goods” broadly49 and apply sales 
law to transactions far outside its substantive scope.  For example, 
in Toby Constructions Products Propriety. Ltd. v. Computa Bar 
(Sales) Proprietary. Ltd.,50 Judge J. Rogers held hardware and 
software to be goods and hence regulated by sale of goods law.  In 
 
46. Enacted in New South Wales as the Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 
1986.  See Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol. 6, 196289 (1992). 
47. For a discussion concerning the various tests see D. GREIG AND N.A. 
GUNNINGHAM, COMMERCIAL LAW 112-14 (3d ed. 1988). 
48. “Goods” includes all chattels personal (broadly, moveable property other than 
choses in action, i.e., recoverable claims such as debts, patents, trade marks, copyrights, 
shares, bills of exchange, insurance policies) or money.  The term includes emblements 
(industrial crops - wheat, potatoes, hay) and things attached and forming part of the land 
which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale.  Sale of Goods 
Act (NSW) 1986 § 5(1); cf the definition of in UCC Article 2-105: “goods” means all 
things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identi-
fication to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, in-
vestment securities (Article 8) and things in action.” 
49. See Toby Constrs. Prods. Proprietary Ltd. v. Computa Bar (Sales) Proprietary 
Ltd. 2 N.S.W.L.R. 48, 54 (1983) (holding hardware and software to be goods).  See also 
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp. 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding computer 
software is goods, the sale of which is regulated by sale of goods legislation).  With re-
spect to software alone, the question in Advent was left open but UCC Article 2 includes 
intangibles.  See KENNETH SUTTON, SALES AND CONSUMER LAW, 90-93 (4th ed., 1995). 
50. 2 N.S.W.L.R. 48. 
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order to accommodate information products, there are decisions 
such as Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corporation,51 which go so 
far as to place the sale of software in UCC. Article 2, even though 
software is licensed and not sold and even though the focus of the 
transaction is not on the acquisition of tangible property, but on the 
transfer of intangibles.52 
Alternatively, perhaps the information product should be de-
fined as the supply of a service?  However, this argument, miscon-
ceives the essential nature of information products, which do not 
fit easily within the traditional definition of services as provided in 
section 4 of the Australian Trade Practices Act.53  While a contract 
with an independent contractor to develop, support, modify, or 
maintain software may come within section 4, the word “services” 
when applied to information products, is largely used in the sense 
of online services or access contracts.  Thus, the court in Caslec 
Indus. Propriety. Ltd. v. Windhover Data Systems Propriety. 
Ltd.54—having taken into account that the “off the shelf” software 
package in question was accompanied by incidental services—
found that the defendant had breached the implied warranty for the 
supply of services in section 74(2) of the Act.55 
However, with the arrival of online distribution of information 
products, the question whether software or other intangibles should 
be treated as a “good” for the purposes of section 5 is no longer 
susceptible to previous analysis.  Without the tangible characteris-
tics that transactions in intangibles once had, there is no longer a 
sale of goods within the traditional definition of the law.56  The 
 
51. 925 F.2d at 676. 
52. See also RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Tri-
angle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Amica 
Inc., 135 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).  These cases make clear that, when confronted 
with the question whether the licensing and transfer of intellectual property should be 
treated as a “sale of goods,” courts in the United States have usually concluded that the 
transaction is within the scope of Article 2 of the UCC. 
53. Trade Practices Act, 1974, (Cth). 
54. Federal Court of Austl., 1992 (unreported) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ca-
ses/cth/ federal_ct/unrep5674.html>. 
55. Id. 
56. See ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 50-55 (2d ed. 1995)(stating that a “pure 
intangible” is defined as “a right which is not in law considered to be represented by a 
document” and comparing dealings with goods and dealings with intangibles). 
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courts are then obliged to fall back on the common law of contract.  
The deficiency in current law regarding pure information products 
is highlighted in St. Albans City Council v. International Com-
puters Ltd.,57 where the English Court of Appeal found there to be 
no sale or hire, as an employee of International Computers went to 
St. Albans’ premises, where the computer was installed, and taking 
with him a disk on which the program in question was encoded, 
transferred it himself into the computer.58  Sir Iain Glidewell found 
that there was no transfer of “goods” and therefore no breach of the 
implied term in section 14 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 and 
that the computer program should be fit for the buyer’s purpose.  
As a result, in finding for the plaintiff, the Court had no recourse 
but to fall back on the common law doctrine of implied terms.59 
2. The World Trade Organization Goods and Services 
Regime 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1994,60 we encounter the same difficulties in characterizing infor-
mation products.  Once again, the goods approach proves workable 
as long as the information product is ultimately delivered in tangi-
ble form.  For example, a book is identified in the customs classifi-
cation system for goods, although the contents of a book could be 
transmitted electronically from one jurisdiction to another and then 
transformed into a book or tangible item.  Since a book is prima 
facie a good, it is expedient to treat the electronic transmission of a 
book’s contents as trade in goods.  Once again, however, informa-
 
57. [1997] F.S.R. 251 (L.A. 1996). 
58. Id. at 251-52. 
59. Id. at 266-67. 
60. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, 
The Legal Texts–The Results of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
20; 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].  Incorporated into the GATT 1994 is 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].  The GATT 1994 specifically excludes the 
Protocol of Provisional Application, but includes the protocols and certifications to tariff 
concessions, protocols to accession, the listed waivers granted under Article XXV of 
GATT 1947 granted before the date the WTO Agreement enters into force, and other de-
cisions of the Contracting Parties of the GATT 1947.  See GATT, para 1, 33 I.L.M. at 
1154-55 (1994). 
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tion products, which are not ultimately delivered in tangible form, 
are problematic.  Many digitized information flows are not readily 
convertible into a physical format that is recognizable as a stan-
dardized good under the trade regime.  For example, statistical 
conventions for balance-of-payments purposes distinguish between 
standardized and non-standardized products.  A mass market “off-
the-shelf” software package is a standardized product and classi-
fied as goods, but customized data on a CD, or customized soft-
ware are treated as non-standardized products and classified as 
services. 
We can draw a similar distinction when considering electroni-
cally-delivered services, for example, where changing the product 
from digitized information to a physical format does not yield a 
product typically thought of as a good.  For example, would a 
medical diagnosis printed on a sheet of paper be regarded as a 
good for customs duty purposes if it were carried physically over a 
frontier rather than being delivered digitally? Under the GATS re-
gime,61 information products that are delivered between jurisdic-
tions as digitized information flows may be classified as services.  
Prima facie, they fall within the second category pertaining to the 
sectors where the services can actually be delivered electronically.  
Indeed, a number of important services are traded electronically 
and in some cases Member States have already made commitments 
under the GATS with respect to these services.62  Nevertheless, 
once again we find that the question of application of GATS to in-
formation products is complicated by factors relating to the classi-
fication of services and nomenclature.  It remains difficult to de-
fine precisely the services that fall into this category as no 
universally agreed classification system exists for services under 
GATS.63  The idea that certain digitized information flows over the 
Internet cannot be characterized as either trade in goods or trade in 
services raises important issues for a trade regime based on princi-
 
61. General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS-THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 325; 33 I.L.M. 1168 
(1994) [hereinafter GATS Agreement]. 
62. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE ROLE OF THE 
WTO, SPECIAL STUDIES 2, Table of Commitments 53-54 (1998). 
63. Id. at 60-66. 
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ples of non-discrimination.64  The WTO Report on Electronic 
Commerce of 1998 recognizes that the trade regime cannot allow 
differential tariff rates purely on the basis of the medium of con-
veyance of a product without creating the risk of trade distortions 
or unfair trade practices.65 
C. The Problem of Characterizing Information Transactions as 
Sale or License 
Whether we consider an information transaction as a sale or a 
license, in each case we find that an essential element is lacking.  
On the one hand, a sale requires a definitive transfer of the “good.”  
The classic concept of a sale is not congruent with the nature of in-
formation as capital and commodity.  In the new global informa-
tion market there is no longer a “sale” of goods within the tradi-
tional description of a contract of sale.  According to Article 30 of 
the Vienna Sales Convention, a sale requires that the seller “trans-
fer the property in the goods” to the buyer.66  Similarly, Article 41 
provides that the “seller must deliver goods which are free from 
any right or claim of a third party”.  In a transfer of information, 
the concept of a sale as a complete transfer of ownership rights, af-
fording the owner the ability to alienate the property by gift or re-
sale, threatens the supplier’s investment in compiling, formatting, 
and updating the information.  On the other hand, the plain mean-
ing of license requires that the “act” to which the license refers 
should, in the first place, be prohibited by law.  This may be the 
case where intellectual property rights exist in the information.  
However, in online transactions, the producer simply takes posses-
sion of the resource, “licensing” small parcels of information to the 
 
64. Gail E. Evans, TRIPS and the Sufficiency of the Free Trade Principles, 2 
JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 707 (1999) 
65. Digital products which can be rendered identical, but which might be classified 
as goods, services or something else, can find their way from a supplier in one jurisdic-
tion to a consumer in another by quite different means.  The WTO Report on Electronic 
Commerce signals the intention to prevent such distortions with a view to maintaining 
policy neutrality in with respect electronically delivered products.  See supra note 59. 
66. Note Article 1 which applies the Convention to “contracts of sale of goods.”  
Some idea of the ambit of the Convention is gained from Articles 2 and 3, dealing with 
types of sales or contracts which fall outside its scope.  See United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (CISG) Apr. 11, 1980, art. 1-3, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981) [hereinafter C.I.S.G.]. 
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user, without the existence of any underlying intellectual property 
rights.67  This would be the case where the information fails to 
qualify for copyright protection.  In sum, the transfer of informa-
tion sits uneasily between the concepts of sale and license. 
III.  THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW INFORMATION ORDER FOR THE 
DIGITAL MILLENIUM 
A.  The Displacement of Copyright 
In the weighing of private and public rights, we must take ac-
count of the fact that the protection of information by contract 
stands in direct contradistinction to the way in which western soci-
ety has traditionally protected information.  Outside the online en-
vironment, the intellectual property regime recognizes that infor-
mation also partakes of the nature of a public good or a common 
resource.  Thus, copyright law gives creators limited property 
rights in their expression of ideas, but regards the information con-
tained in a copyrighted work, like the work’s ideas, to be in the 
public domain and available to be freely used by all.  This dual 
mechanism that protected information has the advantage of pro-
tecting private rights as well as public domain rights in the use of 
information.  Under copyright law the operation of the “first sale” 
or “exhaustion of rights” doctrine means that publishers lose the 
capacity to control re-distributions of copies of their works.68  Sale 
involves a complete transfer of ownership rights in particular cop-
ies from the vendor to the purchaser, following which the pur-
chaser can generally dispose of her copy as she wishes.  As the 
 
67. See Wendy J. Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 
1577-78 (1993). 
68. The “first sale” doctrine places limitations upon the exclusive rights of the copy-
right owner. It prevents the owner of a copyrighted work from controlling subsequent 
transfers of copies of that work. The exclusive right of the copyright owner to distribute 
work is extinguished only in respect of that particular copy.  The “first sale” doctrine only 
limits the copyright owner’s distribution rights and does not affect the reproduction right.  
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [which grants copyright owners the 
exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords of a work], the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). 
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owner of an item of tangible, personal property she can alienate it 
by gift or re-sale.  However, the intangibility of information prod-
ucts and the character of the commercial transaction changes this 
equation.  It has the effect of diminishing existing user rights.  In 
the grant of access to an electronic database the user does not re-
ceive a transfer of ownership rights in the “copy,” but simply a 
limited transfer of rights to use information on stated terms and 
conditions.69  In addition, the ownership of copyright is limited by 
operation of law concerning those uses the public is entitled to 
make of the work.  The scope of copyright is subject to considera-
tions of what is fair and reasonable use of material for certain 
worthwhile purposes.  Fair use or fair dealing provisions70 provide 
the public with defenses to infringement actions when there is a 
fair dealing with works for research or study, criticism or review or 
news reporting. 
B.  The Ascendancy of Contract 
The commodity-exchange theory of Evgeny B. Pashukanis 
serves to explain the ascendancy of contract in the digital millen-
nium.71  In as much as the market economy consists of producers 
of commodities, the exchange of commodities is therefore the cell 
form of legal relations.  The “textual” context of the Web and the 
interactive features of the Net are ideal preconditions for the de-
velopment of a contractual culture.  Contract is uniquely suited to 
networked systems,72 which allow information to be exchanged 
like any other commodity.  The structure of the net enables infor-
mation producers to engage in multiple contractual relationships 
directly, or through intermediaries, with end users and re-sellers.  
In the online exchange of information products, contract law has a 
 
69. See Ticketron Ltd. Partnership v. Flip Side, Inc, No. 92-C-0911, 1993 WL 
214164 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Soderholm v. Chicago Nat’l. League Ball Club, 587 N.E.2d 517 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
70. See Copyright Act, 1968,  §§ 40-42 (Austl.); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
71. Pashukanis, supra note 5, at 120-33. 
72. The increasing importance of contract law in the digital networked environment 
is illustrated by the current European Commission (DG XV) initiative on Electronic 
Commerce.  See Single Market News, Commission Initiative on Services Putting Services 
to Work No. 6 (January 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/smn/sm-
n6/56mn12.htm>. 
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singular advantage in that it allows the parties the freedom of con-
tract to negotiate the terms of information contracts, including the 
use of copyrighted material.  Freedom of contract permits informa-
tion producers, intermediaries and end users to experiment and im-
plement their own set of rules without intervention by the state.  
From this self-regulatory contractual laboratory new legal norms 
emerge.  As the private initiatives, the shrink-wrap, web-wrap and 
click-on licenses demonstrate, for the information industry contract 
law is the instrument par excellence to fill the current legal vacuum 
in sales law for online information products.  As endorsed by Arti-
cle 2B, contract makes it possible for the industry to write its own 
copyright law, in other words, to privately legislate its own intel-
lectual property rights.73  Thus these licenses accord the producer a 
wide scope of protection while the user is commensurately re-
stricted by the terms of usage. 
Article 2B licensing contracts therefore have the capacity to 
extend the scope of the copyright monopoly by restricting public 
domain rights in fair use.  In the reification of contract,74 the poten-
tial for the ownership of information75 may be realized into an op-
pressive domination.  Licensing contracts under Article 2B 
threaten to upset the traditional ordering by creating highly restric-
tive and potentially indefinite monopolies in information.  Article 
2B would give licensors the power to severely limit the licensee’s 
right to deal with the licensed information very likely to the exclu-
sion of current statutory protection accorded the public in the ac-
cess to, and exchange of information and ideas under the fair use 
provisions of the Copyright Act.  This shift in the information or-
der constitutes a significant change in the way information is con-
 
73. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 875 (1999). 
74. Classical contract law presupposes that the contract is a “thing” which can be 
“made” or “broken.”  The tendency to reify the contract in this way has resulted in further 
reinforcing of the private autonomy of the parties.  “If the contract is a thing created by 
the parties, it is easier to see it as a relationship within defined and limited parameters.  
Within these parameters, concepts such as fairness, justice, reasonableness seem to have 
less room to operate than they do with diffuse concepts like tort or restitution.”  P.S. 
ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 14 (1995). 
75. See P.S. ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 357 (5th ed. 1995) 
(linking the notion of contract with the creation of proprietary interests in land). 
EVANSAUREV2.DOC 9/29/2006  3:26 PM 
1999] OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF GLOBAL LICENSES 291 
ceived and protected in our society.  We do not know what the 
consequences will bring.  It is too early to calculate what the even-
tual impact of information licenses might be either on producer or 
user groups.  One only need recall the reception caused by inven-
tions such as the telephone, phonograph and video recorder, to rec-
ognize that with the appearance of every new communications 
technology, there has been a tendency by those with existing pro-
prietary or user interests to dramatically overestimate and miscal-
culate its eventual social impact.  Nevertheless, given the reality of 
the commodification or buying and selling of information via digi-
tal networks, there is a real risk that validated by Article 2B-style 
legislation, information licenses will proliferate.76  To the extent 
that every piece of information could be mass market licensed, 
then licenses would end up essentially regulating rights between 
rights holders and users. 
C.  The Darker Side of the New Information Order 
Contractual self-rule in the consumer cyber-market has a 
darker side.  By delegating to individuals an ability to write per-
sonal copyright law or privately legislated informational rights,77 
the market risks the greater interests of society.  In a world totally 
ruled by contract, weaker parties may loose out, and other funda-
mental freedoms may be jeopardized.  Both freedom of contract as 
a pro-competitive principle as well as the larger interests of society 
in freedom of information are threatened by the terms of informa-
tion licensing which fails to achieve an appropriate balance.  Free-
dom of contract may become contractual coercion, especially when 
dominant undertakings abuse their market power to impose con-
tractual rules on individual and relatively powerless consumers.  In 
an information contract the notion of the consumer bargaining 
from a position of equal strength is a fiction in any but the most at-
tenuated sense.  The enforcement of contracts that permit owners 
to limit the use of information and the development of technologi-
cal self-help measures have given the owner of information con-
siderable means of enforcing exclusivity in the information they 
 
76. J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, supra note 73 at 898. 
77. Id. 
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produce or collect.  This is true not only against those in contrac-
tual privity with the owner, but also in some contexts against the 
world-at-large.  As individual consumers of information, we are all 
faced with the same array of power by information producers.  As 
consumers of information we are relatively weak; we are individu-
als, while the producers are, more often than not, large corpora-
tions.  Information is power, and consumers rarely have the same 
information as suppliers.  They cannot therefore compete as equals 
in the market.  To talk of a “free market” in this situation is mean-
ingless.  Markets are seldom “free”, not because that freedom is 
limited by government activity, but because of the activities of 
business organizations. 
IV.  INFORMATION CONSUMERISM: EMBEDDING CONSUMER RIGHTS 
WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION 
CONTRACTS 
While individual free choice within the notion of freedom of 
contract remains an important value, in respect of the private indi-
vidual consumer, the principle disregards problems of power, dis-
tributive fairness, and the need to encourage sharing and coopera-
tion in the realization of opportunities and innovation in the 
information market.78  In contrast to the laissez-faire model of the 
nineteenth century, in the face of the standard form contract, the 
development of modern contract law shows that the state has in-
creasingly intervened to protect the individual consumer.79  Statu-
tory controls are one method that can be used by the state, in the 
interests of the public as consumers, to attempt to reduce the ine-
qualities that exist.80  The power of the state, expressed through 
government rule-making and regulatory power, is a counter force 
 
78. Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20-22 (Harvard 
University Press 1993). 
79. Statutory intervention saw the decline of freedom of contract in the direct inter-
est of a majority, or to give effect to values which a majority believe to be of overriding 
importance.  See P.S. ATYIAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 726 (Ox-
ford University Press 1979); see also R. BROWNSWORD, The Philosophy of Welfarism and 
its Emergence in the Modern English Law of Contract in WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW 
21, (R. Brownsword et al. eds., 1994). 
80. Goode, supra note 56, at 9-11. 
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to the overweening power of the corporate private sector.81  Con-
sumerism is a movement whose aims are consonant with our desire 
to give small consumers some control over the restrictions on us-
age within information contracts.  To the licensor’s unilaterally 
prescribed restrictive terms of use the law of consumer protection 
might act as an equalizing principle.  The aims of consumer protec-
tion laws are similarly consonant with the intention to give indi-
vidual licensees some equality of power, some redress against the 
corporate producers who provide them with information prod-
ucts.82  It is submitted that the series of rights embodied in con-
sumer protection law are as appropriate for global information so-
ciety as they were for the age of mass manufactures.  These 
include consumer rights to safety, honesty, privacy, and fair 
agreements, as well as rights to know, to choose, to correct abuses, 
and to be heard.83 
A.  Article 2B: Abdicating Consumer Rights in Favor of the 
Nascent Information Economy 
In so far as consumer rights are concerned, the approach of Ar-
ticle 2B is minimalist.  It does not alter the existing state consumer 
protection statutes.84  While it contains a number of consumer pro-
tection rules specifically drafted for information contracts, these in 
fact, do not advance the interests of consumers.85  For example, 
original Article 2 made disclaimer of personal injury damages in 
sales of consumer goods prima facie unconscionable.  Article 2B 
follows that rule for computer programs contained in consumer 
goods.  In other information contracts, however, including cases of 
computer programs, Article 2B relies on general contract law to 
create liability for personal injury.  Article 2B therefore adopts the 
sales law presumption only in cases where that rule is established, 
 
81. See Evans, supra note 45, at 430-34. 
82. On the basic aims of consumer protection laws see JOHN GOLDRING ET AL., 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 1-12 (4th ed. 1993). 
83. Id. at 2-3. 
84. With the exception of the electronic commerce rules in U.C.C. § 2B-105(e), a 
state’s consumer protection statutes or regulations override the general contract law of 
this Article on the effective date of Article 2B. Thus, contract terms may be unenforce-
able because the term is unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2B-110. 
85. Id. 
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but does not extend that rule to publishers of computer encyclope-
dias, interactive games and other contexts.  This pattern reflects a 
belief that goods and information products are not the same.86 
Article 2B does not attempt to address the inequalities specific 
to online information transactions.  On the contrary, Article 2B 
adopts the policy position that the differential between tangible 
goods and information products provides a basis for giving licen-
sors greater freedom of contract.87  Consequently, when the Article 
2B Committee  weighed the cost of creating new sources of recov-
ery against the public interest in encouraging the distribution of in-
formation,  it found the cost to be one the budding information 
economy could ill afford.  Generally speaking, in these early years, 
the drafting committee has resolved to leave unfamiliar and vexing 
questions of unfair terms in mass-market licenses to the courts.  
Thus, Article 2B-105(b) defers to the general legal principle that, 
in certain limited circumstances, terms may be unenforceable be-
cause they violate a fundamental public policy that clearly over-
rides the policy favoring enforcement of private transactions as be-
tween the parties.88  With respect to unconscionable or 
impermissible contracts or terms, Article 2B-105(b) states: 
If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may en-
force the remainder of the contract without the impermissi-
ble term, or it may so limit the application of any imper-
 
86. The NCCUSL, having removed information contracts from the sale of goods 
regime, recognizes that neither the subject matter nor the type of transactions in computer 
information are similar to sales or leases of goods.  See UCITA, Prefatory Note. 
87. See UCC § 2B-105A, Reporter’s Notes. In this respect, Article 2B reflects the 
attitude of the Information Industry that consumers are empowered, through increased 
information and technological tools, to take greater responsibility for the decisions affect-
ing their transactions.  See Fourth TABD Conference To Boost Transatlantic Market-
place, Statement of Conclusions, Charlotte, November 5-7, 1998 (visited Sept. 8, 1999) 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg01/1111tab1.htm>. 
88. The principle that courts may invalidate a term of a contract on public policy 
grounds is recognized at common law and in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  See 
California Pacific Bank v. Small Bus. Admin., 557 F.2d 218, 224 (9th Cir. 1997); Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 178.  This supplementary legal principle is incorpo-
rated under UCC § 1-105(b) and applies to all contract law.  See U.C.C. § 1-105.  U.C.C. 
§ 2B-105 is designed to clarify the nature of the policies that have particular relevance to 
the subject matter governed by U.C.C. Article 2B.  See U.C.C. § 2B-105, Reporter’s Note 
3. 
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missible term as to avoid any result contrary to public pol-
icy, in each case, to the extent that the interest in enforce-
ment is clearly outweighed by a public policy against en-
forcement of that term. 
On the one hand, the advantage of an express reference to pub-
lic policy is that since the concept is known to contract law and 
referable to the fair use of copyright works, it can encompass con-
siderations pertaining to the restraint of trade and the limits beyond 
which it is unreasonable to assert a “proprietary” right in an infor-
mation product. The court, however, is not a legislator.  The public 
policy which a court is entitled to apply as a test of validity to a 
contract is in relation to some definite or governing principle 
which society has already adopted either by way of statute or in-
formally by its general course of conduct.89  A public policy 
“catch-all” is not a mechanism which the private individual con-
sumer can easily invoke against the omnipotent corporate licen-
sor.90  Consumer law worldwide recognizes that it is not feasible 
for the consumer to contemplate the expense of litigation in the 
courts.  That is why consumer law has established consumer 
claims tribunals to receive, investigate, and act upon complaints by 
consumers, and to assist consumers in making and pursuing those 
complaints.91  The Article 2B approach does nothing to either re-
dress the bargaining imbalance or give due consideration to ways 
and means by which the law might adapt consumer rights as stated 
above to the online market for information products. 
 
89. Moreover, U.C.C. § 2B-105 would very likely lead to inconsistency of policy in 
so far as a New York court may hold that a contractual restriction on reverse engineering 
is contrary to the public policy of the state of New York, while an Arizona court may 
conclude that such a restriction is not contrary to the public policy of Arizona. 
90. See further Gerald Dworkin, Judicial control of Copyright on Public Policy 
Grounds, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW 146-147 (Jan 
J.C. Kabel and Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds. 1998). 
91. See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Certain Le-
gal Aspects Of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market, 1128 PLI/Corp. 669, 687 
(1999)(citing Article 17 (2) as it refers to out-of-court settlements for consumer com-
plaints). 
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B.  Adapting Consumer Protection Law to the Marketing of 
Information Products 
Although consumer law deals with transactions in physical 
goods, the underlying rationale of its basic principles, though 
forged in the mass manufacturing age, is nevertheless relevant to 
the marketing of information products.  In Australia, as in other 
comparable jurisdictions, the law utilizes one or more of the fol-
lowing means to defend consumer rights: 
a. Prescription of standards for goods and services; . . . . b. 
Prohibition of conduct which impedes consumers from en-
joying their rights, or regulation of conduct so that it does 
not encroach on those rights; c. Regulation of the agree-
ments entered into between  consumers and suppliers, ei-
ther as to the whole of the agreement, or as to specified 
parts of them; d. Dissemination of information both as to 
rights, and as to particular goods and services, so that con-
sumers may exercise their rights.92 
In adapting the law to online marketing we might consider util-
izing those measures which deal with particular sales and promo-
tional techniques, such as those pertaining to land and motor vehi-
cle or door-to-door sales.93  These situations are distinguished from 
the mainstream consumer transactions by virtue of the character of 
the sale or the character of the marketing environment.  We can 
analogize those situations in which the law currently provides dis-
tinctive kinds of consumer protection to the situation that prevails 
with respect to the online marketing of information products.  First, 
it may be argued that the online marketing of information products 
requires legal scrutiny, in so far as customer goodwill is not always 
a high priority among online suppliers, with emphasis often being 
placed upon a quick, one-off sale.  Second, in the online situation 
there is a general lack of ready comparisons in relation to the qual-
ity of the product being offered.  Third, customers accessing sup-
plier sites from their homes may not be sufficiently on guard or 
critical of the offer being made to them.  Fourth, the exclusivity 
 
92. GOLDRING, MAHER & MCKEOUGH, supra note 82, at 7. 
93. See KENNETH SUTTON, SALES AND CONSUMER LAW 723-26 (4th ed. 1995). 
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and spontaneity of the online medium may be compared in effect 
to a form of high-pressure marketing.  Finally, misrepresentations 
made by online vendors into the privacy of the home may be diffi-
cult for the consumer to prove. 
In the case of larger purchases such a regulatory framework 
might contain one or more of the following provisions: 
[T]he consumer’s right to a period of reflection (“warming 
up”) before agreeing to a contract (consumers would have 
to be informed ‘a priori’ of the contractual terms and condi-
tions proposed by the supplier, who would then have to 
maintain these terms for a 14 day period); this would allow 
consumers to compare various offers and examine the con-
tract adequately before giving their consent; [T]he con-
sumer’s right of withdrawal, that is, the right during a 
“cooling-off” period of 14 days to withdraw from the con-
tact without penalty; [L]imitations on and conditions for the 
use by the supplier of certain means of communications 
(such as limitations on so-called “cold calling,” where a 
consumer is contacted without her prior consent); Com-
plaints and redress procedures for the settlement of disputes 
between a consumer and a supplier.94 
C.  Cross-linked Paradigms: Fair Use as a Consumer 
Protection 
In the case of information licenses it is not only a question of 
giving consumers greater autonomy and bargaining power, but as I 
have argued, a matter of redressing the ability of the licensor, in 
setting the terms of the contract, to create an unjustified private in-
formation monopoly.  Article 2B recognizes that issues of public 
policy present questions of fair use or fair dealing in information.  
In relation to the scope of section 105, the Article 2B Reporter rec-
ognizes that there is a fundamental public interest in assuring that 
information in the public domain is free for all to use and in pro-
viding access to information for public purposes such as education, 
 
94. Commission Proposal For Regulatory Framework For Distance Selling of Fi-
nancial Services, last modified Oct. 14, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/fin-
ances/consumer/891.htm>. 
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research, and fair comment.95  Article 2B leaves questions of con-
tractual terms which are contrary to public policy to the courts and 
while the implications of this reference are not immediately obvi-
ous, it is significant that an earlier motion of Professor McManis, 
which would have expressly disallowed terms inconsistent with 
fair use, was defeated.96  In the event we contemplate legislating 
for fair use in information licenses, the doctrinal difficulty in refer-
encing issues of fair use to contract law, becomes clear.  Then the 
question arises as to whether rules concerning fair use in informa-
tion society should be effected from within the intellectual prop-
erty or contract regimes.  In other words, should we consider re-
forming the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act or should we 
aim to protect public domain rights within the framework of con-
tract law. 
In my view there is no question that, given we are dealing with 
either a common law or statutory license of information, as op-
posed to a statutory grant of intellectual property, substantive pro-
tection should be effected from within the same paradigm, that is, 
contract law.  That given, the issue of restrictive licensing terms, 
albeit its relation to user rights, becomes essentially one of unfair 
trade practices or consumer protection.97  In comparison with the 
fair use exemptions within the law of copyright, consumer law is, 
by its very nature, the more sensitive to restrictive practices.  Un-
fortunately, consumer protection in many countries is ill-suited to 
the information economy.  Today’s consumer law deals mostly 
with transactions in physical goods, not information.  Yet, in re-
spect of information products, click-on standard form contracts 
 
95. UCC § 2B-105, Reporter’s Notes, 3. 
96. In 1998, having failed to gain ALI approval, Professor Charles McManis’ “fair 
use” motion led to a large majority vote for neutrality at the NCCUSL annual meeting, 
and was subsequently rejected by a virtually unanimous Drafting Committee after exten-
sive debate. See Significant Issues for Committee of the Whole, July 1,1998: 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ 
ulc.htm#ucc2b>; see further Issues List: ALI Council Meeting, December 1998: 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/2bisd98.htm>. 
97. Note that the refusal to license intellectual property rights is unlikely to contra-
vene section 46(a) of the Australian Trade Practices Act since the acquisition of intellec-
tual property rights is not taking advantage of market power and a corporation with a 
substantial degree of market power is under no duty to license its intellectual property 
right to competitors.  See Trade Practices Act, 1974, (Cth), § 46(a)(Austl.). 
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threaten to make the contract of sale a museum piece.  Admittedly, 
it requires an intellectual sidestep for those used to thinking of 
bundling information according to the requirements of copyright, 
to now conceptualize both copyright law itself as well as usage as a 
form of consumer protection.  However, the new-sprung and rapid-
paced circumstances of the digital environment require re-
conceptualization of intellectual property doctrines fashioned for 
other times.98 
D.  Beyond Cultural Relativity: Establishing Universal Public 
Domain Rights 
To this proposition, copyright scholars may argue that fair use 
is so culturally relative that the task would inevitably founder.  
While cultural values undoubtedly differ, given the importance of 
finding common ground, we should not be so concerned with dif-
ference that we disregard what is universal in the usage of informa-
tion.99  Not so long ago the intellectual property regime was effec-
tively exempted from the ambit of the trade regime.100  So it is that 
the management of information was once thought of as an area so 
intrinsically linked with cultural heritage that its substantive regu-
lation was a matter of national policy.  It is submitted that once 
again we must look for what is universal rather than what is subject 
to cultural differences.  With sufficient political will, universal 
grounds in the exemption of information for public use can be 
found, and consensus can be achieved. 
As a matter of general principle, the law may forbid unduly re-
strictive terms in contracts in order to protect the public interest or 
insist that certain terms should become compulsory in contracts of 
a particular type.  Similarly, in respect of consumer information 
 
98. Gail E. Evans and Sarah J. Moylan, Software as Discourse and its Implications 
for the Regulation of Information Society, paper presented at the Fourth Ethicomp Inter-
national Conference on the Social and Ethical Impacts of Information and Communica-
tions Technologies, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, 5-8 October 1999: 
<http://www.luiss.it/Ethicomp99>. 
99. See Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society - Proposal for Di-
rective/Background 9 (last modified Dec. 10, 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/co-
mm/dg15/en/intprop/1100.htm> (concerning the compromise reached over research pur-
poses). 
100. See GATT, supra note 60. 
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contracts, we should marry principles of fair use with those of un-
conscionability and unfair trade practices.  Here lies, perhaps, an 
important area of future regulation.  This will necessitate going 
back to first principles.  In tests for liability the focus and the point 
of reference will undoubtedly have to change.  For the licensing of 
information we should take use and the management of use as our 
focal point.  This may mean that the terms and reference of what is 
a fair dealing in information will change.  Of course, such change 
might not necessarily be to the benefit of the user, so long as in 
forging a new constitution for information, in mediating the rights 
of supplier and consuming public, fair use or fair dealing always 
remain a constant. 
V.  TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 
AGAINST UNFAIR LICENSING PRACTICES:  
SOME  INITIAL PROPOSALS 
It is submitted that, in the light of how little we know about the 
exchange of information products online, any thought of exporting 
Article 2B would be premature, not to say reckless.  Thus, mini-
mum international standards for information licenses in what might 
go under the “high-sounding” acronym TRIL or Agreement on 
Trade-Related Information Licenses, should be deferred for the 
time being.  Instead it is submitted that lawmakers would be more 
usefully occupied in constructing a framework for consumer pro-
tection specifically designed to meet the needs of consumers in the 
online marketplace and which would also include provisions ex-
pressly adapted to the exchange of information products.  The ad-
vantages of such a proposal are that it would (a) serve as a mecha-
nism for the reconciliation of producer and user rights in public 
domain information and; (b) encourage consumer confidence in the 
online exchange of information products. 
A. Choice of International Regime 
In seeking a suitable international regime in which to locate 
consumer protection we might choose to follow the reasoning of 
the Article 2B Drafting Committee in placing information con-
tracts within the paradigm of sales law.  In this case we might con-
sider an extension to the contractual regime established by the Vi-
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enna Sales Convention.101  However, we would immediately run 
into the difficulty that it excludes consumer sales.  Thus, the very 
contracts, which it will be important to regulate in order to protect 
consumers from the anti-competitive impact of the information li-
cense, are currently excluded from the legal regime.102  Even as-
suming that the Convention was to apply to consumer transactions, 
we may have problems with its global implementation and en-
forcement.  Currently, the Convention is not of universal applica-
tion and what application it does have can be further limited by 
agreement.103  The role of the Convention is to provide a safety net 
not to set down global standards.104 
In contrast to agreements belonging to the classical interna-
tional legal system, the WTO offers a well-defined and fully inte-
grated governance mechanism.  The one hundred and thirty-three 
states105 who signed the WTO Agreement are bound to comply 
with all the multilateral agreements covering key trade sectors, the 
GATT,106 GATS107 and TRIPS Agreement.108  The World Trade 
Organization has the capacity to compel member states to act in 
 
101. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(C.I.S.G.), April 11, 1980: <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.contracts.inter-
national.sale.of.goods.convention.1980/doc.html> 
102. Art. 2 limits that application by excluding consumer sales, auction sales, sales 
under execution, sales of stocks, shares and other securities, sales of ships, vessels, 
hovercraft or aircraft and sales of electricity from the Convention’s ambit.  See C.I.S.G. 
Art. 2. 
103. See C.I.S.G. Art. 6 (limiting the application of the Convention by providing 
that the parties may exclude the application or derogate from or vary the effect of any of 
its provisions by agreement. It is possible to contract out of the whole or any part of the 
Convention); see also C.I.S.G. Art. 9 (concerning trade usage).  See also Dennis J. Rho-
des, CISG: Encouraging Uniform International Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 387, 402-05 
(1992); See JOHN CALAMARI AND JOSEPH PERILLO, CONTRACTS 5 (3rd ed., 1987). 
104. See also A.M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 23 Int’l Law. 443 (1989). 
105. On December 20, 1998 WTO membership rose to one hundred and thirty three 
with the accession of the Kyrgyz Republic.  See World Trade Organization, (last modi-
fied Sept. 7, 1999)<http://www.wto.org>.  There are currently 30 applicants for acces-
sion, including China and Russia.  See GATT Focus No. 34 3-6, October, 1998 (visited 
Sept. 24, 1999) <www.wto.org/focus/focus34.pdf>. 
106. See GATT, supra note 60. 
107. See GATS, supra note 61. 
108. WTO Agreeement, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS-THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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accordance with their undertakings.  They are then subject to a 
compulsory adjudicatory system which includes an appellate pro-
cedure and automatic suspension of concessions in the absence of 
compliance by an offending member state.109  Moreover, the WTO 
has evolved to provide what is, in effect, a general commercial leg-
islature whose work is facilitated by the phenomenon of “issue 
linkage,”110 or the attachment of subject matter which may be des-
ignated as “trade related”.  By just such means, private rights in in-
tellectual property came within the competence of the trade re-
gime.  Likewise, the WTO could equally well accommodate 
regulations relating to consumer protection for information prod-
ucts.  Not only does the WTO as a transnational legislature have 
the power to provide substantive rules for information transactions, 
but the formulation of policy for trade in information products has 
already begun.  The core of a rationale, which could potentially 
support the construction of minimum standards for the licensing of 
information, already exists.  The WTO study on Electronic Com-
merce 111 recognizes that market forces may need to be comple-
mented by industry self-regulation and/or government intervention 
to secure not only the necessary infrastructure for adequate in-
vestment but also a predictable legal and regulatory environment 
which enforces contracts and property rights. 
B. Initiating Reform Through Global Consultations 
In the matter of global consultation, the WTO as well as trans-
national regional groupings such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and 
APEC are well placed to initiate debate concerning the extent to 
which limitations and exceptions in fair use and dealing within the 
Copyright Act may or may not be overridden by information con-
tracts.  To this end it is submitted that the debate among the mem-
ber states of the WTO could begin with the following proposals: 
 
109. See Evans, supra note 13; see also, Gail E. Evans, Lawmaking Under The 
Trade Constitution: A Study In Legislating By The World Trade Organization 51-54 
(1999), (unpublished  doctoral dissertation, University of Sydney) (on file with the au-
thor). 
110. E.B. Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes 32 
WORLD POLITICS 357, 376-77 (1980). 
111. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 62. 
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1.  That minimum standards in Restrictive Business Practices 
be drafted to include unfair practices in mass market contracts 
and licenses for information products as follows: 
(a) Terms of use of information set out in mass market con-
tracts and licenses should be regulated under consumer pro-
tection law when they restrict or eliminate consumers’ 
rights recognized under copyright law.  In such a case, con-
sumer protection rules relating to the formation and content 
of standard agreements would be made applicable to mass 
market licenses for copyrighted material. 
(b) Courts should be able to review the reasonableness of 
contract terms.  In determining reasonableness, the court 
should be able to consider all of the circumstances, includ-
ing whether the work is available on other terms without 
the restrictive terms and whether it is available in analogue 
formats as well as digital.112 
2. That the TRIPS Agreement be amended to read: 
All statutory copyright limitations, including those imple-
mented on the basis of the promotion of education, culture 
or other general public interest consideration, have prece-
dence over contractual agreements to the contrary.113 
CONCLUSION 
Digital networks have made possible the commodification of 
information.  A private initiative, the click-on license demon-
strates, that for the information industry, contract law is the in-
strument par excellence to fill the current legal vacuum.  In the 
new information order contract has displaced copyright as the pri-
mary form of legal protection.  The risk is that the contractual for-
mat for marketing information makes it possible for the industry to 
write its own copyright law, in other words, to privately legislate 
 
112. IMPRIMATUR Consensus Forum 1998, Contracts and Copyright: The Legal 
Framework for Future Electronic Copyright Management, supra, note 37 at 10 para 2.3.2 
and at 29-30 para 7.4.3. 
113. Id at 10 para 2.3.2. 
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its own intellectual property rights.114  Mass market, single user in-
formation licenses restricting use to no other than domestic use 
must also be seen in the wider perspective of the so-called “copy-
right grab” by an industry, which fears the Internet is a global 
copying machine.115  The endorsement of information licensing 
under proposed Article 2B and latterly under UCITA,116 will 
accentuate the trend by the industry to claim uniform ownership 
rights in undifferentiated information.  Article 2B would give leg-
islative endorsement to this action by the information industry.  
The proponents of Article 2B would postpone providing private 
individuals with consumer protection for information products ap-
propriately tailored to online marketing.  However, the foregoing 
analysis has shown that this is not a prudent policy, since the legal 
provision of a marketplace in which consumers feel secure in their 
transactions, is a goal which is clearly also in the interests of the 
information industry and ultimately in the greater interests of in-
formation society. 
 
114. J.H. Reichman and Jonathan A. Franklin, supra note 73. 
115. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 62. 
116. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
